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Abstract—Creating a secure environment for communications
is becoming a significantly challenging task in 5G Heterogeneous
Networks (HetNets) given the stringent latency and high
capacity requirements of 5G networks. This is particularly
factual knowing that the infrastructure tends to be highly
diversified especially with the continuous deployment of small
cells. In fact, frequent handovers in these cells introduce
unnecessarily recurring authentications leading to increased
latency.
In this paper, we propose a software-defined wireless network
(SDWN)-enabled fast cross-authentication scheme which
combines non-cryptographic and cryptographic algorithms to
address the challenges of latency and weak security. Initially,
the received radio signal strength vectors at the mobile
terminal (MT) is used as a fingerprinting source to generate
an unpredictable secret key. Subsequently, a cryptographic
mechanism based upon the authentication and key agreement
protocol by employing the generated secret key is performed
in order to improve the confidentiality and integrity of the
authentication handover. Further, we propose a radio trusted
zone database aiming to enhance the frequent authentication
of radio devices which are present in the network. In order
to reduce recurring authentications, a given covered area is
divided into trusted zones where each zone contains more than
one small cell, thus permitting the MT to initiate a single
authentication request per zone, even if it keeps roaming
between different cells. Accordingly, once the RSS vectors
and the encrypted mobile identification are received by the
authentication slice (AS), this latter builds the authentication
vector using the k-nearest neighborhood technique to estimate
the kdh fingerprint distribution which is compared to the radio
trusted zones database to prove the legitimacy of the MT and
the network slice (NS). Cross-layer authentication protocol
is consequently executed. The proposed scheme is analyzed
under different attack scenarios and its complexity is compared
with cryptographic and non-cryptographic approaches to
demonstrate its security resilience and computational efficiency.
Index Terms—Cross-layer authentication protocol, Recommen-
dation system, Radio trusted zone database, k-NN, SDWN.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless connectivity has progressively secured its place in
the last decade to be an indispensable part of our communica-
tion means that has undoubtedly increased mobile traffic load.
According to [1], mobile data traffic is expected to expand at
a compound annual rate of 57% until 2019 and is predicted,
by year 2020, to exhaust the available capacities provided by
the fourth generation (4G) and the long term evolution (LTE)
infrastructures [2].
In addition, network densification using low-power small
cells is considered to be a core solution for 5G. This new ar-
chitecture indeed demands new requirements such as flexibility
in management and configuration, adaptability and vendor-
independence. To meet these requirements, software defined
wireless networks (SDWN) have been proposed as a cost-
effective solution [3]. Hence, the hetnet nature of 5G with the
separation of data and control planes and the virtualization of
major network functions increase the need for authentication
improvement, integrity, and privacy protection in the presence
of malicious actors [4].
The traditional authentication handover mechanism is based
on a cryptographic key and on multiple handshakes. The
authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol which
is standardized by the third generation partnership project
(3GPP) in [5] is widely used in current wireless networks.
In brief, the AKA protocol involves three entities which are
(i) the mobile terminal (MT) which represents the user, (ii) the
home environment (HE) and (iii) the serving network (SN).
AKA allows the SN to authenticate and exchange keys
with the user, without ever being given the user’s key. Instead,
one-time authentication vector (AV) are issued to SN by the
HE. All communication and computations in AKA are very
efficient thanks to the use of symmetric-key cryptography. To
this end, the client authenticates the network by computing
the response (RES) using its k secret key and the network
authenticates back to the client across-AV by associating
its response with the expected response (XRES). Using
symmetric cryptography, AKA shares a k secret key with the
MT and the HE in order to maintain the privacy and security
of the information.
By exploring and investigating the security analysis of
current authentication protocols, we pinpoint several of their
vulnerabilities against different attacks including resistance
attacks, black hole attacks, replay attacks, man-in-the-middle
attacks, impersonation attacks, and denial of service attacks
[4]. We also note that considerable research has been made
to improve such protocol. For instance, in [6], the authors
propose a security enhanced authentication and key agree-
ment (SE-EPS AKA) method based on wireless public key
infrastructure by using the ellipse curve cipher (ECC) en-
cryption. Additionally, the research work in [7] points out
a scheme which resolves the privacy problem and prevents
mobility management entity (MME) masquerading. Moreover,
the devised scheme takes into consideration the fact that
the MT is energy-limited and for that reason, public key
cryptography is not used at the MT. The mechanism in [8]
suggests an enhanced AKA protocol using a methodology
which provides zero-knowledge proof using a pre-shared key
that is never sent over the transmission medium. A new key
exchange procedure is proposed in [5] where the user identity
information and authentication vector in the network domain
are encrypted using the public key cryptosystem. The public
parent key adopted in local authentication is generated by
means of random data. In [9], the authors show that their
proposed approach eliminates the synchronization between
mobile station and its home network in the key exchange
process. Besides the discussed vulnerabilities, the conventional
AKA authentication protocol may not fulfill the requirements
of future dense small 5G network cells in terms of security,
resistance to spoofing, low latency, infrequent handover and
low computational costs [10].
Alternatively, it has been shown that exploiting the
environment-dependent radiometric features of a specific
transceiver pair, such as the channel state information (CSI)
[11] and the received signal strength indicator (RSS) [12],
can improve the authentication procedure. In fact, these
channel characteristics can be used to differentiate signals
arriving from authorized transmitters and those originating
from spoofed transmitters [13], [14]. Moreover, [15] presents
a comparative survey of wireless local area network location
fingerprinting schemes. The foundation behind these schemes
is that RSS is location-specific, due to path loss and channel
fading, where most works in this category usually assume that
the users are static; thus generating an excessive false positive
rate in mobile scenarios. Accordingly, an attacker who is at
a different location from the genuine user might be placed in
different RSS profiles and whereby can infer the RSS of the
user by using a wireless sniffer tool.
To tackle these challenges, a promising cross-layer
authentication method is proposed in this paper. The novelty
of our work lies in devising and evaluating a multi-layer
approach which amalgamates physical layer information (i.e.,
non-cryptographic) [16] in conjunction with cryptographic
procedures. In this context, we define two security level
agreements (SLAs) which are devised for decentralized and
centralized networks, respectively. These agreements are
established at the beginning between the network slice (NS)
and the authentication slice (AS).
Moreover, we prosed the use of a radio trusted zones data
base at the AS side. In fact, a given covered area is divided into
trusted zones where each zone contains more than one small
cell, thus permitting the MT to initiate a single authentication
request per zone, even if it keeps roaming between different
cells. On the other hand, the data base of each zone contains
the different RSS profiles and their corresponding localiza-
tions. Thanks to the widely used radio mapping technique,
this database is filled. Hence, this approach aims to add
another security level to the system and reduce the recurring
authentications in the network.
At the MI side and for non-cryptographic procedures, the
gathered RSS measurements at the MT are used to generate
the kth fingerprint aiming to randomize the secret key used by
the AKA protocol. After this step, a cryptographic approach
employing an enhanced AKA protocol is performed in order to
improve the confidentiality and integrity of the authentication
handover. Furthermore, sending the mobile identity (IM) on
the fly in a clear form (without encryption) is still another
weaknesses of the AKA protocol. We address this problem
by generating a radio signal fingerprint that prevents such
transmission patterns, thus obscuring IM. Subsequently, the
obscured IM is encrypted and then transmitted with the RSS
parameter to the AS to corroborate the MT identity within the
NS.
Once received, the AS, in response, sends an AV built with
the aid of the kth fingerprint, to approve the NS identity into
the MT. In addition, before AS sends AV to MT across NS,
AS applies the k-nearest neighborhood (k-NN) technique
on the revived RSS with the existing data base to estimate
the kdh fingerprint distribution. The nearest output of this
algorithm is used to identify the corresponding legitimate
location stored in the database. It should be mentioned that
the inaccuracy of the estimation technique does not affect the
reliability of the proposed protocol because the identification
of legitimate location is already takes into consideration the
localization error range to define the trusted radio zones.
Finally, the AKA authentication protocol is performed as
operated in conventional cryptographic protocols.
To have better insights into this work, we frame the set of
contributions of this paper as follows:
1) Defining two SLA for decentralized and centralized
5G networks and proposing a cross-layer authentication
approach based on SLA specifications.
2) Exploiting the random and unique RSS measurements
in order to compute a secret kth fingerprint.
3) Enhancing the security level of 5G networks by intro-
ducing a novel approach rendered by the creation of a
radio trusted Zones database.
4) Executing security protocol analysis and validating
the sensitivity of the proposed cross-layer protocol
against different threats by leveraging the AVISPA
tool. Additionally, comparisons of the computational
complexity of the proposed scheme against traditional
cryptographic and non-cryptographic approaches are
also conducted.
To the best of author’s knowledge, the cross-authentication
approach along with radio trusted zones have not yet been
devised and evaluated in the literature. The remainder of
this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the
proposed system model and the protocol design. In Section III,
the security and performance analysis are evaluated. Finally,
this paper is summarized in Section IV, where a number of
future endeavors are also put forward.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROTOCOL DESIGN
In order to tackle the important security challenge in
SDWN-based 5G HetNets which results from the separation
of the radio control plane from the data plane, we propose
an AS as a third party security agent to provide isolation and
efficient security authentication management over the integral
network. Therefore, a cross-layer authentication procedure is
proposed. This procedure is mainly based on increasing the
security level of the AKA protocol by using physical layer
information and machine learning algorithms at the server side
in order to estimate the authenticity of the radio devices. The
following subsections will detail the various steps related to the
proposed protocol, namely, fingerprint generation, estimation
and distribution, the cross-layer authentication and protocol
design.
A. Generation of the kth fingerprint
In our approach, we employ a channel-based fingerprinting
mechanism to enhance the authentication procedure. Towards
this end, we first define two SLAs which address decentralized
and centralized networks, respectively. For decentralized net-
works, the authentication procedure is comprised of two steps.
For centralized networks, a complete three steps approach is
applied. These agreements are established at the beginning
between the NS and the AS.
After defining the agreement, the non-cryptographic procedure
is performed. As shown in Figure 1, the RSS measurements
from different base stations are gathered and then averaged. In
fact, to make this RSS parameter unique and random to suit the
generation of the kth fingerprint key, different RSS values from
various radio devices are required to compute the average.
Otherwise, considering a single RSS measurement from one
radio device and due to the multi-path propagation environ-
ment, two different users on different locations may have the
same value, which hinders the security of the protocol. Hence,
the received radio signal strength from different radio devices,
when collected at the uth MT side, can be represented as
RSSu = [R1,t1 , R2,t2 . . . , RN,tn ], (1)
where ti is the time of arrival of the signal received from
the ith access point Ri,ti to the u
th MT at a given location.
This time of arrival significantly reduces the possibility to
impersonate the RSS vectors by an intruder.
The MT then averages the RSS vectors to generate the kth
fingerprint such that
k = E[RSSu], (2)
where E[.] is the mean operator.
The generated kth fingerprint aids in randomizing the secret
key that is used by the AKA protocol. After this step, the AKA
protocol is performed at the MT. As a first step in this protocol,
the IM is masqueraded by the kth fingerprint. The output of
the masquerading, dubbed as temporary identification mobile
(TIM) aims to hide the device IM. After masquerading, in
order to protect TIM from catching attack, this latter is
encrypted with the AES ecryption algorithm. Finally, MT
sends TIM with the RSS vectors to the AS to corroborate
the MT identity within the NS.
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Figure 1: RSS vectors transfer between 5G radio devices
through the MT in a SDWN Architecture
B. Estimation of the kdh fingerprint distribution
In this section, we will first introduce the proposed radio
trusted zone concept that we consider in our system design to
recognize the legitimacy of different radio device identities
in the network. To this end, each zone is set to form a
cluster of neighboring small cells. The database of this latter
is built thanks to radio map database using the localization
fingerprinting method in [15].
Since building the radio trusted zone database is out of
the scope of this paper, in the remaining of this work, we
assume the existence of this database at the AS side. Once the
radio signal is received (i.e., TIM and RSS vectors), the AS
analysis the RSS vectors and computes the kth fingerprint as
given in Eq. (2). The resultant key is used to unmask TIM in
order to corroborate the IM authenticity within the NS. After
this step, the deterministic k-NN method is used to estimate
the kdh fingerprint distribution. In fact, the k-NN method
is one of the simplest ways to determine the fingerprinting
process of wireless devices by using a radio map database.
Hence, in contrary to our solution, the conventional k-NN
method is victim of false positive alarms when its output is
compared to a radio trusted zone without taking into account
the localization error range. Finally, in the proposed system,
the k-NN process considers multiple nearest neighbors to
compute the kdh fingerprint distribution as follows
kdh = min
√√√√
Y∑
y=1
(RSSu −RSSy)
2
, (3)
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Figure 2: Cross-layer authentication handover procedure
whereRSSy is the RSS vector stored in the radio trusted zone.
The resultant kdh is used to identify the corresponding location
in the trusted radio zones database, taking into account the
localization error range, to prove the legitimacy of the radio
device. In the next subsection, we will detail the key exchange
process; handover through the cross-layer authentication pro-
tocol.
C. Cross-layer Authentication Protocol
The procedure of keys’ exchange between different network
entities is exhibited in Figure 2. In this context, we assume
that NS possesses previous credentials to coordinate with the
AS. The following steps within the authentication protocol
are executed only if the MT is a new user or enters a certain
trusted zone for the first time.
Step 1:
• MT computes the kth fingerprint based on Eq.
(2) and masquerades IM with the kth resulting
TIM.
• MT sends TIM and RSS vectors to AS in re-
sponse to the demand made by the NS.
Step 2:
• AS generates the kth fingerprint based on RSS
vectors and IM from TIM, and kth.
• AS estimates kdh fingerprint distribution and
search its corresponding legitimate localization
in the radio trusted zones database that has been
previously built.
• AS generates AV only if the legitimate localisa-
tion is found in the database.
Hence, AV will contain the following keys
• MAC = f1( k
th, AMF, SQN, RAND)
• XRES = f2( k
th, RAND)
• CK = f3( k
th, RAND)
• IK = f4( k
th, RAND)
• AK = f5( k
th, RAND)
• AUTH = SQN⊕AK||AMF||MAC
where ⊕ and || denote the bitwise XOR and the concatenation
operations, respectively. The notions f1 to f5 are the AES
cryptographic hash functions, SQN is the fresh sequence
number, AMF denotes a public authentication management
field handled by the network operator, RAND signifies
a random number, IK symbolizes the integrity key, CK
refers to the cipher key, AK is the anonymity key, MAC
denotes message authentication code, XRES is the expected
response, XMAC is the expected MAC and AUTN implies
the authentication token.
It is important to note that for the decentralized network,
the cross layer authentication algorithm ceases in step 2 thus
AS sends the AV[RAND, AUTH] to MT without passing by
NS, then MT verifies SQN and compares XMAC with the
MAC to validate the network. Therefore, for the case of the
centralized network, the AS sends AV[RAND, AUTH, XRES]
to the NS and then the NS sends AV[RAND, AUTH] to MT.
Subsequently, the MT calculates different keys as follows:
• AK = f5( k
th, RAND)
• SQN= 1st(AUTN) ⊕ AK
• XMAC= f1(k
th, 2nd(AUTN), SQN, RAND)
• RES = f2( k
th, RAND)
• CK = f3( k
th, RAND)
• IK = f4( k
th, RAND)
After calculating the keys, the following is performed:
Step 3:
• If SQN is in the correct range, then the XMAC
is compared with MAC to validate the network.
• If SQN is not in the correct range, then the
connection is rejected.
• Once validated, MT calculates its RES value and
sends it to the NS for validation.
• NS compares RES with XRES that is already
present in the authentication vector.
• If RES is equal to XRES, then the MT is also
authenticated by NS and mutual authentication
is achieved. Otherwise, it is rejected.
III. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSES
In the following, we perform automated security analysis to
asses the security level of the proposed cross-layer authenti-
cation protocol using the Avispa tool to verify its resistance
against various attacks. Moreover, we leverage a JAVA API to
estimate the computational cost of the proposed scheme.
A. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the conventional
authentication protocol and the proposed authentication
protocol. In the first scenario, we assess the security of
the conventional AKA protocol. Since this protocol sends
its pre-shared key over the air, we consider herein that an
intruder in the network has the knowledge about the key.
In contrast, in the second scenario related to the proposed
protocol, the intruder is unable to acquire knowledge about
the pre-shared key given that this protocol does not send the
key over the air. In both scenarios, the intruder performs
several typical attacks (i.e., man-in-the-middle, redirection,
replay, etc.) on the protocols.
1) Scenario 1: In this scenario, the MT sends the IM and
the secret key k on the fly to AS to initiate the authentication
process. This process is formalized and then assessed using
Avispa tool, As depicted in Figure 3 the protocol analysis
indicates UNSAFE, revealing that the protocol is vulnerable
to various analyzed threats.
Figure 3: Avispa simulation for scenario 1
2) Scenario 2: As described in our protocol, MT sends
IM encrypted with RSSu on the fly to AS. In contrast to
the conventional mechanism, MT, SN and AS generate the
kth fingerprint separately which improve the security as the
fingerprint is never sent on the fly. This is corroborated
by conducting protocol analysis using Avispa tool, which
indicates that this protocol is SAFE (against the analyzed
threats) as shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Avispa simulation for scenario 2
In the following, we detail how different attacks could be
performed under scenario 2 and how our protocol design is
resilient against such threats.
a) Redirection attacks and black-hole attacks: The mo-
bile identification is not protected in the current mobile net-
work and can be altered by an adversary with some devices
such as an IM catcher, which leads to the redirection attack. In
our protocol, the kth fingerprint is used to masquerade the IM
and thereby protects 5G networks against redirection attacks.
Accordingly, the attack fails if the malicious user is unable
to obtain the legitimate user information from the MT. In
the proposed protocol, the MT computes the IM embedded
with the kth fingerprint generating TIM and sends it to the
AS. The authentication request is denied if the AS fails to
match the IM sent by the MT. Such a technique solves the
problem of miss-charged billing in the 5G network. Thus, the
proposed scheme immunes the 5G network from black-hole
attacks.
b) Replay attacks: The cross-layer protocol is resilient
against this attack by solely sending the RSS vectors and
TIM during the transmission of information over the network.
This prevents the misuse of valid information; an adversary
typically can delay the message over the network and sends
it later for some malicious purpose if no random number or
fingerprint is involved in the transmitted message.
c) Man-in-the-middle attacks: A man-in-the-middle
attack occurs when an adversary eavesdrops the communicated
information between the MT and the NS. In the context
of the our proposed cross-layer protocol, the kth key is
independently generated in the MT, AS and NS. This key
prohibits the communication from being eavesdropped.
d) Impersonation attacks: Over the 5G network, the
corruption of the control plane endangers the security of the
whole network. Following are some scenarios in which an
adversary may attempt to impersonate the 5G network.
Case 1: Consider the presence of a fake NS where an in-
truder can eavesdrop all its messages. The adversary
must reply with a valid response RES to the NS in
order to impersonate the MT, but the intruder cannot
obtain the correct RES since this latter is exchanged
exclusively between the MT and an uncorrupted AS.
Case 2: If the intruder attempts to impersonate an
uncorrupted network, the attempt would fail as the
MT can verify that previously, there was no initiated
request for AV. Furthermore, MT only exchanges
traffic with trusted radio devices (i.e., the radio
trusted zones database).
e) Denial of Service (DoS) attacks: The DoS attack and
its variants are discussed in the following scenarios; the at-
tacker MT’s flood the victim control plane with authentication
requests by spoofing the IM/TIM, the k key and a request
number.
Case 1: The attacker MT floods the NS victim with self
IM. If the malicious MT does not respond within the
threshold time duration to the proxy, then the con-
nection is simply terminated. Accordingly, NS resets
the authentication request and releases the resources
that are used to maintain the authentication request
status. In addition, if the request is originating from
a malicious user, then the proxy will not acquire the
kth key or would simply receive an invalid kth key.
There is a timeout period for each MT to maintain
the state of half-opened authentication requests. If the
malicious MT attempts to cause an overflow at the
victim NS with the half-open authentication requests,
NS would not be able to accept any new incoming
authentication requests.
Case 2: The attacker MT floods the victim NS by spoofing
IM. In this scenario, if the actual MT that receives a
message is not active, then the AS will not receive
any information from the MT, and this process
becomes similar to first case; the NS waits for a
threshold time to hear from the AS. After the timeout
period, the NS resets the authentication request and
releases the resources that are used to maintain the
authentication request status.
In fact, in this protocol, the AS is supposed to
receive an RSS vectors from the MT, which is neither
an actual IM of the MT nor a TIM for the NS.
An actual IM or TIM with a fake kth key will
not be able to extract the correct IM of the MT
and thus the connection will be terminated. Hence,
there is no chance that the attacker would be able
to generate the same kth from a victim MT’s IM.
Indeed, given the aforementioned information, we
assert that the proposed cross-layer AKA protocol
protects the network from DoS attacks.
B. Computational cost analysis
We further thought that it would be insightful to analyze
the computational cost of our proposed cross-layer protocol.
In this context, it is important to note that the SDWN
paradigm introduces the cloud radio access networks (C-RAN)
paradigm, which aims at reducing the computational cost as
most of the processing activities are executed on the distributed
cloud. Moreover, the well-trusted radio zones database is
formed by small cells; a mechanism which avoids frequent
authentication of the MT within each small cell.
We perform comparisons of the non-cryptographic and
cryptographic authentication algorithms against the proposed
cross-layer protocol For our analysis, we exploit a dataset of 25
radio signal strength samples collected for 280 combinations
of user locations and orientations.
Since our proposed cross-layer protocol is implemented in
Java, a Java API is developed for this evaluation purpose
to be coherent and to generate real time perspectives of the
computational cost. Moreover, we use an Intel Core i7-6700
CPU with 3.4 GHz X64 based processor and 16 GB RAM to
conduct the computations.
The results of this comparison is shown in Figure 5, which
demonstrates the computational cost of cryptographic, non-
cryptographic and the proposed cross-layer protocol across
small cells with and without employing the trusted zone
approach at the AS level. In the case where the proposed
protocol operates without employing the radio trusted zones,
we observe a clear increment in computational cost in com-
parison with non-cryptographic and cryptographic procedures,
respectively, and this gap increases when the number of
cells increases. The augmentation is due to the fact that our
proposed cross-layer protocol operates in this specific case
without a trusted zone and uses machine learning algorithm
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Number of small cells
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
C
o
m
p
u
ta
ti
o
n
a
l 
co
st
 (
m
s)
Cross-Layer without radio trusted zones
Cross-Layer with radio trusted zones
Crypto aproach
Non-Crypto aproach
Figure 5: Cross-layer authentication protocol with and without
radio trusted zones, in comparisons with cryptographic and
non-cryptographic approaches
to authenticate the radio devices. The absence of a trusted zone
increases the recurrence of authentication procedures, which
leads to more complexity.
Once the radio trusted zones’ approach is employed, the
computational cost of the proposed cross-layer protocol
drops in contrast with the first approach. This renders the
deployment of a radio trusted zones a better choice to achieve
a lower complexity and thus reduce latency.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a software-defined wireless net-
work (SDWN)-enabled fast cross authentication scheme that
combines non-cryptographic and cryptographic algorithms to
tackle the challenges of latency and weak security in 5G
HetNets. First, the radio trusted zone database concept is in-
troduced aiming to reduce the authentication recurrence. Con-
sequently, the cross-layer algorithm is designed, implemented
and evaluated. By executing automated protocol analysis using
the Avispa environment, the security posture of our cross-
layer authentication protocol in terms of resilience to various
attacks is analyzed. The results show that the proposed scheme
satisfies 5G security requirements and its advantages have
been verified by simulations. Further, the proposed protocol
causes considerable deduction of traffic authentications, thanks
to the introduction of the radio trusted zone unit. Finally,
a Java API is developed to compute the complexity of our
system and to compare it against cryptographic and non-
cryptographic approaches. It is shown that if a radio trusted
zone is employed, the computation complexity is significantly
reduced in comparisons with the two latter approaches, by
limiting the authentication recurrence. As for future work, we
will be focusing on employing machine learning techniques to
properly classify the various RSS profiles of a HetNet in an
attempt to build reliable and efficient radio trusted zones.
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